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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet 
Union countries took a bumpy road in their transition to a market economy. The real 
sectors of these economies experienced a sharp contraction in 1998, output was only 
around 50 percent of its 1989 level (see Table 1). During the period of 1989 to 1998, 
the real sector had accumulated a huge amount of outstanding debt and arrears and 
noncash payments had become a dominant feature of these economies. Taking Russia 
as an example, total payables to the enterprise sector exploded from around 20 percent 
of GDP in 1994 to over 70 percent of GDP in 1998, while total receivables rose from 20 
percent of GDP to about 45 percent of GDP over the same period. Associated with 
these phenomena, noncash payments and barter started to rise from 8 percent in 1994, 
when inflation was under control, to more than 50 percent of sales in 1998 (see Figure 
Al). 
Table 1. Real GDP in Selected Transition Countries, 1998 
Relative to 1989 
(1989 = 100) 
as’ 54 Central Europe 95 
Russia 55 Poland 117 
Ukraine 37 Czech Republic 93 
Azerbaijan 44 Hungary 95 
Belarus 78 
Kazakhstan 61 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
’ CIS denotes Commonwealth of Independent Sates 
In contrast to the contraction of the real sector, the number of commercial 
banks in these economies increased rapidly. In Russia, the number of commercial banks 
increased from fewer than 100 in 1988 to about 2,400 in 1994 and 2,500 in 1998.3 Many 
3Although the number of banks has increased dramat.ically, the Russian banking sector is still quite 
concentrated. In 1997, the top five banks accounted for 36 percent, and the top 50 banks for 71 
percent, of total assets. About three-quarters of all household deposits were maintained with Sberbank. 
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of those banks are owned by large firms. Despite the boom in the number of banks and 
their cross holdings in the real sector, banks failed to lend to firms, and banks’ credit 
to the real sector declined substantially in these economies. For example, in real terms, 
Russian bank credits to the real sector declined by almost 60 percent, while the ruble 
loan interest rates were very high (Table 2).4 
Table 2. Bank Credit to the Real Sector 
(in billions of rubles) 
total loans 
foreign 
currency 
ruble loans interest rates’) inflation2) 
1996 247 117 130 146.8 47.7 
1997 310 130 180 32.0 14.7 
1998 422 298 123 41.8 27.7 
1999 597 304 293 39.7 85.7 
2000 956 368 588 24.4 20.8 
2001 1418 474 944 17.9 21.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Central Bank of Russia 
‘)commercial banks’ 3-months lending rates in percent 
‘)consumer price index in percent 
Why did banks refuse to lend to firms. ‘7 Where did commercial banks invest 
instead? Evidence shows that they concentrated their investments in treasury bills. For 
example, by the end of 1997, commercial banks in Russia invested almost three-quarters 
of ruble deposits in federal government securities. 5 A similar picture emerges from 
other FSU countries, notably Ukraine (Table 3). In fact, Russian and Ukrainian banks 
are among the worst performers in transition countries in terms of mobilizing savings 
and allocating credit to the private sector, and they are a key factor underlying the 
surge of nonbank finance, including trade credit and barter trade, in these economies. 
The irony is that even bank owners in these economies chose nonbank financing for 
their manufacturing and trade, while letting banks absorb credit from these large firms 
4 In nominal terms ruble loans to the real sector declined by 31.7 percent, from 180 billion rubles to 
123 billion rubles, between 1997 and 1998. 
5 See OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1997, Paris, 1997-1998. 
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and invest in government bonds. Both countries experienced a continued decline over 
time in the scale of banking activities with respect to the real sector. After the massive 
privatization, the ratio of credit to the private sector declined from 12 percent of GDP 
in 1994 to 8 percent in 1997 in Russia, and from 5 percent in 1994 to 2 percent in 1997 
in Ukraine. By contrast, the average ratio for all the transition countries was 22 percent 
of GDP in 1994 and 23 percent in 1997. 
Table 3. Credit to the Private Sector in Transition Countries 
(in percent of GDP) 
1994 1996 1997 1999 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Czech Republic 40 57 68 44 
Hungary 26 22 24 21 
Poland 12 16 18 19 
18 
25 
16 
18 
12 
5 
1 
7 
6 
7 
11 
7 
1 
9 
5 
11 
10 
8 
2 
3 
10 
9 
10 
12 
9 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington), various 
issues 
Given the poor economic performances of Russia and Ukraine, it is not surprising 
that a financial crisis occurred in 1998. However, the very fast and strong recoveries in 
Russia and Ukraine after the 1998 financial crisis caught many observers by surprise. 
In 1999, Russia and Ukraine experienced positive growth for the first time since the fall 
of the Soviet Union. The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook, adjusted its forecast of 
economic growth for Russia upward several times. Russian GDP grew by 3.2 percent in 
1999, 7.5 percent in 2000, and 5 percent in 2001; and 4.4 percent growth was expected 
in 2002. Similarly, in Ukraine, GDP growth was 5.9 percent in 2000 and 9.1 percent 
in 2001; and the economy was expected to grow by 5.0 in 2002 (see Figure A3). Total 
arrears and barter have started to decline in Russia. In particular, barter and noncash 
payments dropped by 20 percent in 1999 and continued to decline in 2000 and 2001 
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(see Figure Al). 6 Even more interesting is the fact that commercial banks started to 
lend to the real sector after the crisis. Ruble loans to the economy more than doubled 
in nominal terms between 1998 and 1999 from 123 billion rubles to 293 billion rubles. 
At the same time, lending rates of commercial banks declined sharply in nominal as 
well as real terms (see Table 2 and Figure A1).7 A similar picture emerges for Ukraine, 
where bank credit to the private sector increased from 2 percent of GDP in 1997 to 9 
percent of GDP in 1999 ( see Table 3 and Figure Al). 
These observations on Russia and Ukraine before and after the 1998 financial 
crisis seem puzzling. First, although the number of banks increased substantially, 
arrears and barter started to explode in Russia after 1994, when macroeconomic 
stabilization was in place. Thus, the banks’ failure to lend to the real sector and 
the noncash economy do not appear to be a consequence of hyperinflation. Second, 
following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1998 that brought down many banks, 
arrears and barter started to decline. This is not what one would expect, because a 
financial crisis usually causes widespread liquidity shortages and often leads to a credit 
crunch, forcing firms to run up more arrears and engage in more barter transactions. 
Third, immediately after the financial crisis, Russia and Ukraine started to have 
substantial economic growth for the first time since the collapse of the U.S.S.R. This 
stands in contrast to the experience of many other economies, for which financial crises 
have led to sharp output decline.’ 
These puzzles raise many question. What explains the separation between 
the financial and the real sectors before the crisis ? What is the relationship between 
the noncash economy, on the one hand, and the exuberance in financial markets, on 
the other hand? How can we explain the unexpected high growth of the Russian 
and Ukrainian economies after the 1998 financial crisis? Has the unexpected growth 
something to do with the decline in barter trade and the increase in bank lending to the 
real sector? If so, what is the function of a financial crisis in this process? 
6According to the interfax news agency the share of barter in sales dropped as well in Ukraine from 
33 percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2000, and to 8 percent in 2001. The Russian Economic Barometer 
estimates that noncash payments have dropped to below 10 percent at the beginning of 2003. 
7Due to the collap se of the government treasury bills market, the large exposure of portfolios of 
commercial banks to this market made many banks insolvent. This has led to a consolidation and 
concentration in the banking sector with 3 state banks (of which one is Sberbank) now accounting for 
about 80 percent of the assets. Moreover, Sberbank started to aggressively enter the lending market 
pushing some of the existing large banks out of this market. For the restructuring of the Russian 
banking sector after the crisis, see Interfax Center for Economic Analysis, Russia‘s Largest Banks in 
1999, Moscow 1999. 
8 Based on a samp le of 195 crisis episodes across 91 developing countries, Gupta, Mishra and Sahay 
(2001) find in their study on ouput responses to financial crisis that around 60 percent of the crises have 
been contractionary. Moreoever, Loayza, and Ranciere (2001) fi n in the countries that experience a d 
fall in output after crisis, that it takes on average 4 years for output to recover. 
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We develop a model to address the above questions. Our model assumes severe 
information asymmetry in these economies, so that banks are not able to distinguish 
good credit risk firms from bad ones. Thus, banks charge high interest rates on loans 
to all borrowing firms. This, in turn, induces good-quality firms to turn to nonbank 
finance, such as trade credits and barter trade, which involves less of information 
asymmetry but are more costly. ’ The option for good firms to raise liquidity through 
nonbank finance drives up bank lending interest rates further, since banks expect that 
only lower-quality firms will borrow. In equilibrium, then only low-quality firms borrow 
from banks while good-quality firms turn to nonbank finance, and the banking sector 
looks for high-yield government securities in which to invest. We call this a banking 
trap, in the sense that the financial sector is separated from the real sector of the 
economy. This separation hinders banking sector development and economic growth, 
although on the surface there is financial exuberance, particularly in the government 
securities market. Using data from a survey among firms in Ukraine in 1997, our 
empirical evidence suggests that bank loans were mainly allocated to firms of low 
quality. 
Our theory thus highlights the role of the financial sector before and after the 
crisis.” It suggests a link between the government’s budget deficit and the noncash 
economy which has been overlooked so far. In our model, the government’s public 
debt and the size of the noncash economy are simultaneously determined. It is 
frequently argued that arrears and barter in Russia and Ukraine are driven by tax 
motives. By allowing firms to hide some of their profits, thereby lowering their taxable 
income, nonbank finance is seen to contribute to the difficulty of raising taxes and 
thus causing the government’s budget to explode. Our theory suggests, in addition, 
that the government’s budget deficit is crowding out bank lending to the real sector 
by creating an environment in which banks invest in the treasury bills market, which 
g In our model, we take the existence of non-bank finance for firms as given and focus on the banking 
failure. In a recent paper Marin and Schnitzer (2003) argue that barter is a response to a banking 
failure. Barter is a trade credit between firms which is repaid in goods rather than cash. Marin and 
Schnitzer take the banking failure as given and argue that barter offers a deal-specific collateral which 
effectively lowers credit enforcement costs. 
lo For insightful discussions of the role of the financial sector in economic transition, see Berglof and 
Bolton (2002). 
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offers exceptionally high returns, and the real sector turns to nonbank finance to meet 
its liquidity needs.‘r r2 
Our theory also offers an explanation of why the 1998 crisis has had some 
beneficial effects for the economies of Russia and Ukraine. Our explanation links the 
puzzling facts that following the crisis of 1998 the noncash economy started to decline 
in Russia and Ukraine, the banking sector started to lend to the real sector and loan 
interest rates declined sharply. When the Russian government defaulted on its bonds 
in August 1998, the securities market collapsed. Although many banks with large 
holdings of government securities collapsed, the economy turned around, moving from 
negative growth to positive growth. We argue that the vanished market for government 
bonds induced the surviving banks to reallocate their assets to the real sector at lower 
interest rates to attract borrowers. Lower loan interest rates, in turn, made it attractive 
for some better-quality firms to start borrowing from banks rather than to continuing 
to use nonbank finance. This improved the average creditworthiness of the pool of 
borrowers and, in turn, further lowered interest rates and induced more firms to switch 
from barter trade to bank loans. The strong economic recovery naturally followed, 
and also provided an opportunity for the banking sector to further develop.r3 Based 
on data for 20 transition countries, we test the prediction that the financial crisis was 
a trigger for more rapid long-run economic growth and banking development. Our 
evidence shows that before the crisis, the allocation of bank credit to the real sector of 
the economy was, indeed, hampered by the government’s overissuing of bonds and by 
the opportunities firms had to engage in barter trade, but after the crisis, banks started 
to provide more loans to firms at low interest rates. 
l1 In the debate over the non-cash economy tax reasons figure prominently as an explanation. However, 
empiricial evidence for Russia and Ukraine suggests that tax motives have only minor importance, 
while the lack of liquidity and high borrowing costs for bank loans are the prime motivation for firms 
to engage in barter trade, see Commander and Mumssen (1999) for evidence in Russia, and Marin, 
Kaufmann, Gorochowskij (2000) for evidence in Ukraine. 
l2 According to Shleifer and Treisman (2000) this was the price Russia had to pay to achieve 
stabilization of inflation. Rather than printing money to finance the budget, the government issued 
treasury bills and maintained artificially high interest rates on these bills to co-opt the banks who 
havily invested in this market. Yields on the GKO market reached up to 60 percent (see Figure 1). 
l3 During the crisis the ruble depreciated by more then fifty percent (see Figure A3) which may be an 
alternative explanation for why barter dropped after the August crisis in Russia. However, Ukraine had 
only a mild depreciation of the exchange rate but also experienced a sharp drop in barter and arrears 
after 1998. This suggests that some other force is at work here. Similar arguments also apply to oil 
prices after 1998 given Russia is an oil exporter while Ukraine is an oil importer. Another alternative 
argument that the return to the cash economy in Russia is due to a reversal in capital flight after the 
August crisis does not seem to be supported by the data. Westin (2000) and Loungani and Mauro 
(2000) argue that capital flight picked up again in Russia after the tightening of capital controls in the 
aftermath of the crisis. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop a model 
of the bank-firm relationship in a “lemons market” a la Akerlof (1970). In Section III, 
we characterize the equilibrium of the lemons market in which the financial and the 
real sectors are separated. Section IV describes how the financial crisis has helped 
the economies of the CIS countries and the Baltics to get out of the banking trap. In 
Section V, we test the predictions of the model with firm-level data from Ukraine and 
with country-level data for 20 transition economies. Section VI concludes. All proofs 
are provided in Appendix II. 
II. Model 
We consider an economy with A4 banks and N firms, where N > A4; and the 
government. 
Firms: Firm i’s (i = 1, . . . . N) quality, measured as its probability of being solvent, 
Xi, is only known to itself. The quality of firms can be ranked as Xl > X2 > . . . > XN. 
But the ranking of firms is not known to any particular bank and firm in the market. 
The average quality of all firms is 5 N = h C,“=, Xi, which is known to all the firms and 
banks. The liquidity demand of firms can be met through borrowing from banks or 
through other means, such as borrowing from other firms in the form of trade credits 
in cash or in the form of trade credits in goods (barter trade)14. We will call these 
alternative forms of finance as nonbank-financing (NBF). To meet their liquidity needs 
profit maximizing firms choose the cheaper way between bank financing and NBF. 
To simplify the analysis we assume that NBF cost b is constant.15 NBF cost b is 
a reduced form capturing many possible interpretations.16 
l4 Overdue trade credits in cash (firm arrears) and trade credits in goods (barter) exploded in Russia 
and other FSU economies. Usually goods used in barter are not fixed assets and heterogeneous in 
quality. This means that these goods are typically not collaterizable assets for bank loans due to high 
cost of quality assessment or selling for banks. For barter as a collateralized trade credit, see Marin 
and Schnitzer (2002). 
l5 This assumption can easily be relaxed without changing the qualitative results. For example, one 
could make b to depend on firm characteristics like the firm’s level of quality. However, as will become 
clear later this complication would reinforce the separation result we will derive in the next section 
without adding insight. 
l6 In addition to solving liquidity problems, it is argued that NBF may cut costs since it may reduce 
hold-up or disorganization problems (Marin and Schnitzer, 2003); may help firms in tax evasion (for 
empirical evidence, see Commander and Mumssenl999; and Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij, 2000). 
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Government: We suppose that the government’s total revenue equals its tax 
revenue plus its borrowing and NBF firms evade taxes. r7 Given the possibility for tax 
evasion, the government is assumed not to be able to collect taxes effectively. For any 
given government revenue, R, the lower the tax revenue, T, the more the government 
issues bonds to finance its expenditures B = R - T. 
When there are n NBF firms the tax revenue is reduced to T = (N - n) t, where 
t is the tax paid by each firm. To borrow more, the yield of government bond, s, has 
to be higher.” To capture this idea in a simple way, we assume that the yields of 
government bonds, s, is a positive linear function of the amount of borrowing. When 
there is no tax evasion the interest rate of government securities reaches its lower bound 
with s = 4~0, where C$ is the investors’ relative confidence in government securities. 
When the relative confidence in government securities is the same as that of investing 
in the private sector, then 4 = 1; otherwise it is $ > 1. To make things simple, we treat 
CJ~ as a reduced form and take C$ and t as exogenously given.lg 
To summarize, we have the government security yield equation, which is a 
function of the number of NBF firms in the economy, 
B b-4 s(n) = 7$~ &- (N-+ 
R - Nt 
where, B is planned government borrowing; and B (n) is realized government borrowing. 
Bank-firm relationship: We assume free entry in the banking sector. Facing 
competition, each bank makes its investment decision based on expected returns. If 
the expected return of investing in government securities is higher than that of lending 
to a firm, banks will invest in government securities rather than lend to firms; and 
vice-versa. 
We suppose that there is asymmetric information between banks and firms 
such that banks are not able to identify which firm is of good quality and which is of 
bad quality. Asymmetric information between banks and firms is a severe problem in 
transition economies. Most banks in transition economies are new and have very little 
experience with credit evaluation. Furthermore, the lack of accounting standards and 
l7 Although in our model NBF is driven by financial considerations, NBF offers better opportunities 
for firms to evade taxes. This is confirmed well with the empirical evidence for Russia and other FSU 
countries (see Commander and Mumssen, 1999; and Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowskij, 2000). 
r8 The government can either issue government bond domestically with a high yield; or borrow from 
foreign investors by issuing dollar denominated bonds and paying higher interest rates. 
rg Alternatively, 4 may also be interpreted as a risk premium on government securities. 
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market valuation of firms’ assets makes it difficult to evaluate firms’ creditworthiness. 
The only information that banks are assumed to have is the average quality of the firms 
in the economy, 3,. Thus, banks’ ex ante belief of the probability that a firm will be 
able to repay its loan is 1,. Therefore, banks’ expected rate of return of lending to 
firms is rNXN, where TN is the rate of repayment of a solvent firm when there are in 
total N firms borrowing. Comparing the expected rate of return of lending to a firm 
and investing in government securities, the arbitrage condition for a bank is 
(1+rjv)Xjv = l+s. 
Or the rate that a bank will charge to a firm will be 
TN = (1 + s)/T;N - 1. 
Facing this rate, TN, a firm i with a probability of success of Ai, will face an expected 
marginal cost of borrowing from the bank of 
&(l + TN) = (1+s)$ 
If raising liquidity through NBF is less costly than borrowing from banks, firm i will 
borrow from other firms. The condition for this to happen for firm i is then 
Xi > b - 
AN - 1+s’ 
Thus, we have, 
Lemma 1 Firm i will use NBF if and only if: 
b?& xi > - 
1+s’ 
Notice that & is the ratio between and the cost of raising $1 liquidity through 
NBF and the yields of government bonds, which also affects the cost of raising $1 
liquidity through a bank loan. From Lemma 1, obviously, a firm is more likely to use 
- 12 - 
NBF to solve its liquidity constraint, when the marginal cost of NBF b, is low, or the 
interest rate charged by banks, s, is high. Moreover, the higher is the quality of a firm, 
Xi, the more likely it engages in NBF. The intuition of this result is straightforward. 
With information asymmetry between banks and firms, banks charge an interest rate 
according to the market average quality. As a result the high quality borrowers subsidize 
the low quality borrowers in the pool of different quality borrowers. Turning to NBF 
helps this high quality firms to escape to subsidize the low quality firms. 
III. Separation of the Financial and the Real Sector 
In the previous section, we have shown that in a lemons lending market good 
quality firms face higher borrowing costs than bad quality firms. As a result good 
quality firms are more likely to use NBF to solve their liquidity problems than to 
borrow from banks. Moreover, as better quality firms switch to NBF to meet their 
liquidity problems, it generates an externality on the lending rates of banks, because 
the average quality of the pool of borrowing firms is lowered. Consequently the lending 
interest rate goes up, which in turn leads more better quality firms to turn away from 
banks. This logic repeats until in equilibrium only the bad quality firms borrow from 
banks and the good quality firms raise liquidity through NBF. That is, in equilibrium 
the financial sector is separated from the real sector of the economy. In the following 
we show this separating equilibrium formally. 
First, we illustrate conditions for a separating equilibrium between the financial 
and real sector when s is exogenously given. We then derive a separating equilibrium 
with s being endogenized. To make things simple, we assume that Xi = Xi-r - p for all 
i = 1,2, . . . . N, and AN = y. 
Associated with this assumption, for a given /J, N can be interpreted as a 
measure of heterogeneity of the firms, which determines information asymmetry. When 
N is large, the degree of information asymmetry between firms and banks in the 
economy is high, and subscript i now can be interpreted as a label for a group of firms 
that have the same quality Xi. Under this assumption, the average quality of all firms is 
The firms’ quality can be ranked as X1 > X2 > . ..&-I > X, > . . . > AN. We assume that 
the ranking is not known to any agent in the economy. Let us suppose that X, satisfies 
the following condition, 
- 13 - 
b&yr 
X,-l > - 
1+s 
> A,. 
According to Lemma 1, this condition implies that firms with subscript i 5 n - 1 will 
not borrow from banks because their cost of borrowing is too high. All other firms with 
i 2 n will find it cheaper to borrow from banks. Thus, at the starting point the n - 1 
high quality firms do not borrow from banks. 
In the following lemma (proof in Appendix II), we show for exogenously given s 
that when the bank lending market is a lemons market, in equilibrium the higher the 
ratio y, the fewer firms will borrow from banks. 
Lemma 2 There are three possible equilibria in a lemons bank lending market: 1). if 
1 5 y, the equilibrium is n* = N and no firm borrows from banks; however; 2) if 
JC@- > y, the equilibrium is n* = 2(N+l) - 0 and all firms borrow from banks; and finally,3). 
if N+2 < y < 1, there exists an equilibrium n* E (0, N) such that all firms with 
su~~r$t i 5 n* do not borrow, while all the remaining N-n* firms borrow from banks. 
Lemma 2 shows that in a bank lemons lending market with sufficiently high 
yields of government securities s relative to the NBF costs b in equilibrium no firm will 
borrow from banks and the financial sector is separated from the real sector. However, 
if the ratio between the treasury bill rates and NBF costs is sufficiently low, all firms 
will borrow from banks. At a moderate ratio, low quality firms only will borrow from 
banks. 
So far we have assumed that the yields of government bonds s is exogenously 
given. However, s will depend also on the number of NBF firms in the economy. In the 
following, we endogenize the yields of government bonds s to make its value depends 
on the number of NBF firms in the economy. Substituting s (n) into the condition in 
Lemma 1, the no-borrow condition becomes 
s(n) 2 ti (4 
with 
(2) 
s(n) = h-0 1+ RtNtn 
( 
as the government securities yields equation; and 
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Te-4 = b(N-n+2) -I 2(N-n+l) 
as the banking lemons market equation. The following proposition (proof in Appendix 
1I)gives conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the good quality firms do not 
borrow from banks.20 
Proposition 1 If (b - 1) (1 - T) > qb, > $$$ - 1, a unique interior equilibrium 
n* E (0, N) , s* E (h, E) exists such that n* better quality firms do not borrow and 
the remaining N - n* low quality firms borrow from banks. Moreover, the equilibrium 
value of n*, s* increase with t, +r, and decrease with R. 
Intuitively, when the number of NBF firms increases, the government’s tax 
revemie T declines, which in turn pushes up the yields of government bonds, s. This, 
in turn, may lead more firms not to borrow from banks. The switching from borrowing 
to NBF will generate a negative externality on other borrowing firms who may stop 
borrowing as well. As a consequence s is pushed further up which will again induce 
more firms not to borrow. This cycle repeats until s is too high to attract more 
borrowers; or the borrowing firms are of too poor a quality to switch to NBF. 
The above result illustrates a banking trap. Banks invest in government bonds, 
while firms, in particular good quality ones, solve their liquidity problems through NBF. 
The economy is stuck in the banking trap which causes a separation between the real 
sector and the banking sector. This separation result between the real and the banking 
sector is substantially different from a conventional ‘government crowding out’ story 
because information asymmetry is one of the key factors which cause the separation. 
The following example illustrates that when the degree of information asymmetry 
increases, the separation between the two sectors becomes stronger. In our simulation 
we ‘calibrate’ the model with data from Russia in 1997 before the August financial 
crisis. The total government expenditure in percent of GDP in Russia was 18.4% in 
1997. Thus we choose 18% for R. Since planned tax revenue T is not observable we 
assume a value of 10 for T. With respect to the value of the exogenous benchmark 
lending rate T, we use an average lending rate of Czech commercial banks, which were 
among the best established banks in transition economies, between 1997 (13.2%) and 
1999 (8.7%), which was 10%. 
2o The result shows only the case that is most relevant. to our evidence. A full characterization of the 
equilibria of the model is available upon request. 
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Examplel: NBF and Information Asymmetry. We consider two economies which 
differ in the degree of information asymmetry between banks and firms but share all 
other parameter values with T = 0.10, 4 = 1.5, b = 2.1, R = 18, T = 10. 
Case 1: Moderate degree of information asymmetry: N = 10. Figure 1 gives the 
resulting NBF equation + (n), which is defined in the proof of Proposition 3.2 and the 
government security yield equation s (n). The intersection of the two equations gives 
the equilibrium at point T at which 61 percent of the firms do not borrow from banks 
and the government security rate s settles at 26 percent. In Russia in 1997 more than 
50 percent of firms’ sales were financed by other firms in the form of barter transactions 
and the treasury bills market rate reached 28 percent (see Figures Al to A3). Thus, for 
reasonable parameter values the model is quite consistent with the data for Russia in 
1997. 
0.6.. 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 
Figure 1: Moderate Information Asymmetry 
Case 2: High degree of information asymmetry: N = 160. Figure 2 gives the 
corresponding NBF equation $ ( ) n and government security yield equation s (n). At 
the new equilibrium at point T 98 percent of the firms are involved in NBF and the 
treasury bill rate reaches 33.4 percent. 
The example illustrates that an economy with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry suffers from a stronger separation between the real sector and the banking 
sector. By contrast, a conventional crowding out story would not depend on the degree 
of information asymmetry between banks and firms as is the case here. 
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Figure 2: High Information Asymmetry 
IV. Financial Crisis and Banking Development 
In the previous section we have derived an equilibrium in which the financial 
sector is separated from the real sector and the yields of government securities s are 
high. In this section we analyze how an exogenous shock in the agents confidence in 
the government which is triggered by the government’s default and the fire sale of 
government securities affects an economy with separated financial and real sectors. 
A strong negative confidence shock, i.e. an exogenous negative shock in 4 
creates a substantial drop in the yields of government securities s.~~ As a result, the 
banks which are heavily invested in government securities will suffer major losses. The 
immediate effect of such a financial crisis on the real sector is, however, limited when 
the two sectors are separated. 
Corollary 1 With the separation between the banking sector and the real sector, the 
plunge of #, has no immediate impact on the member of good quality firms n* which do 
not borrow from banks, although banks may make losses. 
Typically, a financial crisis leads to a sharp fall in GDP followed by a slow and 
gradual recovery, as observed in crises in Latin America in the 1980s and in Nordic 
countries in the 1990s.22 In an economy in which the financial and the real sectors are 
separated, however, a financial crisis may be beneficial for the economy. When 4, thus 
s plunge, banks’ options outside of the real sector disappear. This induces banks 
21 To make the model simple, we choose to treat the financial crisis as an exogenous event. Our 
analysis focuses on the consequences of a financial crisis. 
22 See footnote 6. 
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to lower lending interest rates to attract more firms. As a result, some good quality 
firms switches back to borrowing from banks, and the average quality of borrowers 
further improves. The improved quality of the borrowing pool further lowers bank 
lending rates, and thus inducing more good-quality firms to borrow. Moreover, when 
more good-quality firms borrow, the tax revenue goes up. This reduces government 
borrowing, which leads to a further drop in s. This logic leads to a new equilibrium in 
which better-quality firms borrow from banks; loan interest rates go down; and banks 
invest less in government securities. The ‘separation’ syndrome disappears if the shock 
is strong. 
Starting from an economy where n* good quality firms use NBF, we show now 
in the following proposition (proof in Appendix 1I)that the banking sector gets to 
reconnect with the real sector when $J drops. 
Proposition 2 If the banking sector is separated from the real sector in an economy, 
a financial crisis caused by a plunge of 4 may lead to an integration of the two sec- 
tors. In the new equilibrium, the ‘separation’ syndrome may diminish or even disappear 
associated with a substantial lower lending rate. 
Our result is consistent with what has happened in Russia. The financial crisis 
in Russia was triggered by the default of the government. Investors lost their confidence 
in government securities and the treasury bond market collapsed. Any bank that had 
survived this big shock needed to change its portfolio dramatically and started to lend 
to the real sector at much lower lending interest rates than before the crisis. Comparing 
bank lending to the private sector in 1997, the year before the financial crisis, with that 
in 2000, reveals an increase in bank lending in Russia and in Ukraine from 8 percent 
and 2 percent of GDP, respectively, to 12 percent and 9 percent of GDP, respectively, 
while barter trade declined by about 30 percent. 
It is important to point out that although the financial crisis can destroy the bad 
equilibrium associated with a banking trap, it only provides the initial conditions for 
banking development. This is because severe information asymmetry is the key factor 
which causes the separation between the real sector and the banking sector. As long as 
information asymmetry between banks and firms is severe, a financial crisis may not be 
a sufficient trigger to pull the economy out of a banking trap. Indeed, the following 
example illustrates that when the degree of information asymmetry is large enough, the 
lemons market problem is so serious that a financial shock is not enough to pull the 
economy out of a banking trap. 
Example 2: The Impact of Financial Crisis on Banking Development and the 
Role of Information Asymmetry. We look at two economies with the same parameter 
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values as in the previous example (‘calibrated’ to Russian data before the crisis) given 
by r = 0.10, b = 2.1, T = 10, R = 18. The initial value of confidence into government 
securities is the same, 4 = 1.8. The only difference between the two economies is 
assumed to be the degree of information asymmetry. 
Case 3: Moderate degree of information asymmetry: N = 10. Figure 3 gives the 
1c, (n) curve and the lines s (n) and s’ (n) before and after, respectively the financial 
crisis hits the economy. Before the shock (4 = 1.8) the equilibrium settles at point T 
at which 74 percent of the firms are involved in NBF with a government security rate 
of 34.8 percent. After the shock (a drop in 4 to 1.2), in the new equilibrium no firm 
engages in NBF and the treasury bill rate is 12 percent. 
Figure 3: Moderate Information Asymmetry 
Case 4: High degree of information asymmetry: N = 160. Figure 4 gives the 
$ (n) curve with three lines before the shock s (n), after a moderate shock s’ (n) , 
and finally after a drastic shock s” (n) . Before the shock, the economy settles at an 
equilibrium T at which 98.8 percent of the firms engage in NBF and the government 
security rate is 40 percent. With the same moderate shock as in Figure 3 (captured 
by a drop in 4 from 1.8 to 1.2) the new equilibrium at T’ still gives 97.6 percent of 
firms involved in NBF and a treasury bill rate of 12.1 percent. Only with a drastic 
drop of 4 from 1.8 to 0.3 is the NBF economy removed and no firm barter trades with 
a government security rate of 3 percent. 
The example illustrates that a small confidence shock in government securities 
is sufficient to bring an economy out from the separation between the real sector and 
the banking sector if the degree of information asymmetry is moderate. However, a 
large shock is required to do the same for an economy with a high degree of information 
asymmetry. The example demonstrates how the financial shock interacts with the 
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degree of information asymmetry and thus highlights the relative importance of each 
factor for banking development. 
1. W9 
0.8’~ 
0.6.. 
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Figure 4: High Information Asymmetry 
V . Empirical Evidence 
A. Firm-Level Evidence 
We first examine the predictions of our model on the behavior of firms when 
there is a high degree of information asymmetry between firms and banks; and when 
there is a high level of government borrowing. Our investigation is based on data of 
about 100 firms which engaged in barter trade in Ukraine in 1997. We interviewed 55 
firms to obtain information on 165 barter deals. Each firm provided us with 3 barter 
deals. Each barter deal involved 2 firms, a seller and a buyer. Many of the firms were 
well informed about the financial and economic conditions of the firms they traded with 
because they served as financiers. Table 4 and Table 6 give descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis.23 
Our model predicts that low quality firms will predominantly finance their 
production with bank loans. We examine the relationship between bank lending and 
the characteristics of firms in Table 5. In the table we run the regressions for all firms in 
the sample (first four columns) and then for firms with positive bank debt only. We use 
the firms’ bank debt in percent of sales DEBT as the dependent variable. 62 percent 
of the firms have positive bank debt with an average ratio of bank debt to firms sales 
of 6.3 percent (see Table 6). As a measure for the firms’ quality Xi we use the variable 
23 For a more detailed description of the data sample see Marin, Kaufmann, Gorochowksij (2000). 
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WAGEARREARS. WAGEARREARS is a proxy for the firms’ quality, since a firm 
which stops paying its workers must be in desperate financial and economic conditions. 
The more indebted the firm is vis-a-vis its workers the less likely it is that the firm 
will be able to repay its bank loans and thus the larger the banks’ credit risk. Thus, 
our theory predicts a positive sign on the WAGEARREARS variable. Turning to the 
results it appears that WAGEARREARS is significant and positive in all specifications. 
Table 4. Bank Lending and Firm Characteristics 
bank debt in percent of sales 
Q O-105 IO-105 o- 10 
100% 38% 52% 10% 
mean 0.802 0.823 0.800 0.752 
BARTCOST Anova:F-test 2.13 
sign. level (0.123) 
mean 4.55 2.79 4.10 13.53 
TOT Anova:F-test 2.02 
sign. level (0.136) 
mean 3.38 2.01 3.11 9.99 
WAGEARREARS Anova:F-test 12.27 
sign. level (0.000) 
mean 4679.9 1121.3 7222.5 4981.4 
EMPLOY Anova:F-test 1.85 
sign. level (0.162) 
Source: Data Sample of 165 Barter Deals in Ukraine in 1997 
Next, we include BARTCOST and TOT as variables capturing the NBF cost b. 
BARTCOST is an index which takes the value of zero if the firms output is produced 
with only one input and approaches one when the firm uses several inputs from other 
sectors. We use BARTCOST here as a measure of the cost of raising liquidity via 
barter. When a firm trades in many inputs it will have more leverage in barter trading 
between varieties of goods and thus will have lower bartering cost. We expect a negative 
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coefficient on BARTCOST.24 Turning to the results BARTCOST is negative and 
significant suggesting that firms with higher barter costs borrow more from banks. 
Furthermore, we include the variable TOT into the regression which captures 
the terms of trade effect of barter. We will use it here as a measure for the credit costs 
of barter. TOT measures in percent the extent to which barter shifts the terms of trade 
in favor of the firm extending a trade credit within barter. The larger the shift in the 
terms of trade the more costly it is to raise liquidity via barter trade. For given costs 
for bank loans an increase in the credit costs of barter induces firms to switch to bank 
loans to solve their liquidity needs and thus we expect a positive sign on the TOT 
variable. TOT turns out to be positive and highly significant at conventional levels. 
Lastly, we introduce the variables STATED and EMPLOY to control for 
ownership and firm size. One possible reason why the bad quality firms receive more 
bank loans than other firms is that the bad firms may be state owned and/or large. State 
owned firms or large firms may have better creditworthiness because of the expectation 
of a state bail out. It turns out, however, that neither STATED nor EMPLOY are 
significant at conventional levels in the all firms regressions. In the regressions for firms 
with positive bank debt (last four columns) STATED is not significant and firm size 
appears to hinder the firm to get loans (the relationship is significant and negative). 
B . Cross-Country Evidence 
In this section we examine the prediction of the model that a financial crisis may 
trigger a change that can substantially improve conditions for banking development. 
We will use country level data for 20 transition economies. In these economies financial 
systems in Russia and Ukraine are among the least developed. Our firm level evidence 
for Ukraine presented in the previous section suggests a separation between the real 
and financial sector that only bad quality firms borrow from banks. 
24 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) use the same variable as a measure for the hold-up problems of firms. 
The larger the number of inputs used for production the more complex the production and the more 
bargaining problems arise. In their theory of barter Marin and Schnitzer (2003) suggest lower bartering 
costs for firms with more complex production. They argue that barter trade helps firms to deal with 
the hold-up problem. 
Table 5. Determinants of Bank Lending to Firms 
(1) 
all firms 
(2) (3) (4) (1) 
firms with bank debt 
(2) (3) (4) 
In(WAGEARREARS) 0.988 0.959 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ln(BARTCOST) -5.237 -5.163 
(0.000) (0.000) 
TOT 0.033 
(0.05 1) 
STATED 
ln(EMPLOY) 
0.955 
(0.000) 
-5.144 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.05 1) 
-0.099 
(0.817) 
0.952 
(0.000) 
-5.144 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.053) 
-0.121 
(0.814) 
0.011 
(0.938) 
0.888 0.850 0.891 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-3.474 -3.389 -3.457 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.034 0.036 
(0.002) (0.002) 
-0.321 
(0.304) 
0.884 
(0.000) 
-3.238 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.003) 
0.074 
(0.833) 
-0.204 
(0.029) 
R2 Adj. 0.353 0.375 0.368 0.360 0.344 0.435 0.436 0.475 
N 86 86 86 86 59 59 59 59 
OLS - regressions; p - values in parentheses 
Source: Data Sample of 165 Barter Deals in Ukraine in 1997 
WAGEARREARS = wage arrears in percent of sales 
BARTCOST = index which takes the value of zero if the firm trades with only one other firm, and which tends to one if the firm trades with many firms 
TOT = SCASH - PCASH 
SCASH is the difference between the barter price and cash price in percent of the cash price for the trade credit side of the barter deal. 
PCASH is the difference between the barter price and cash price in percent of the cash price for the goods payment side of the barter deal. 
STATED = dummy variable with value 1 when the firm is state owned 
EMPLOY = firm’s number of employees 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Number of 
observations 
WAGEARREARS 3.4 6 0 38.6 150 
BARTCOST 0.80 0.12 0.34 0.92 141 
TOT 4.59 18.07 -168.00 50.00 163 
EMPLOY 4386.6 17518.1 8 130000 165 
BANK DEBT 6.31 15.96 0 104.20 150 
STATED D=l, 43 observations 
Source: Data Sample of 165 Barter Deals in Ukraine in 1997 
We look for comparative evidence on the determination of bank intermediation 
at the macro level across transition countries. 25 Our theory predicts that a country’s 
level of bank intermediation is driven by the extent of information asymmetry between 
banks and firms, by the level of the government budget deficit, and by the level of barter 
trade. The government’s budget deficit induces banks to invest their excess liquidity in 
government securities which crowds out bank lending to the real sector of the economy. 
Barter trade leads banks to charge high interest rates so that they end up lending little 
to firms. 
We start by examining commercial banks’ lending rates. We expect that 
economies with a larger degree of information asymmetry between banks and firms, 
with a larger size of government deficit, and with a larger share of barter trade to have 
higher commercial banks’ interest rates. We use commercial banks’ 3-months lending 
rates as the dependent variable. We measure the degree of information asymmetry 
between banks and firms by the country’s EXPORT SHARE and/or by incoming 
foreign direct investment as a share of GDP FDI/GDP. Both variables are supposed 
to capture the average credit risk of the real sector. The idea is that the larger the 
export share and the larger, the share of incoming foreign direct investment in percent 
of GDP the better the quality of the real sector and thus the lower the interest rates 
that banks will charge. Turning to the results in Table 7 this turns out to be the 
case, since both variables are negative and significant in the majority of specifications. 
25 The empirical results of this sect,ion give casual evidence only, since due to the lack of data we were 
unable to deal with the problems of endogeneity and multicollinearity adequately. 
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The variables GOVDEBT and GOVDEF are both measures for the government’s soft 
budget constraint. The former is the government’s debt outstanding and the latter is 
the government’s deficit both in percent of GDP. Lending rates will as well be affected 
by yields of government securities given the possibility for banks to invest in securities.26 
As expected GOVDEBT or GOVDEF have both a positive and significant inhuence on 
interest rates except when the variable FDI/GDP (Stock) is included in the regression. 
The variable BARTER measures the share of barter in percent of sales in transition 
countries. As predicted the variable tends to increase banks’ lending rates. Finally, we 
include the EBRD index of commercial law LEGAL to control for differences in the 
legal environment across transition countries. Not surprisingly, improvements in the 
effectiveness of the legal system tends to lower interest rates. 
Next, we investigate how information asymmetry and government borrowing 
affects the level of bank intermediation across transition economies. A country’s level of 
bank credit to the private sector in percent of GDP is used as the dependent variable. 
We want to test whether countries with a higher degree of information asymmetry 
between banks and firms, and with more government borrowing have a lower level of 
bank intermediation. Table 8 gives the results. As core variables we use the same 
variables as before in Table 7 explaining commercial banks’ lending rates. We find 
that the variables EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP are both positive and significant 
at conventional levels suggesting that the lower degree of information asymmetry (the 
larger EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP), th e more banks lend to the private sector. 
The variables GOVDEBT and GOVDEF as measures for the size of the government 
sector are both not significant (except for one specification) suggesting that the size of 
the government budget has no extra effect on the level of bank lending which works 
beyond the channel of banks’ lending rates (in Table 7 we found that these variables 
tend to increase banks’ lending rates). In specification 4 of Table 8 we include BARTER 
(and exclude GOVDEBT and GOVDEF because they tend to be correlated with 
BARTER27) and find as predicted that the larger a country’s exposure to the non-cash 
economy the lower its level of bank lending to the private sector. 
26 In Russia the government offered exceptionally high yields on government bonds to make it 
attractive for banks to invest. In 1996 Russia was among the transition countries with the highest 
spread between bank loan and deposit rates. Our model suggests that bank loan rates are driven by 
the yields of government securities which may explain why the spread in Russia is particular wide. For 
the spreads in the banking sector in transition countries, see Transition Report 1998. 
27 Our model predicts that BARTER and GOVDEF will be correlated. The larger the budget deficit 
the larger the yields of government bonds and banks interest rates and thus the less attractive it is 
for firms to borrow from banks. They switch to barter instead. Furthermore, the more firms barter, 
the smaller will be t,he government’s tax revenues, because firms will tend to exploit the possibility to 
evade taxes when bartering. 
Table 7. Determinants of Banks’ Lending Rates Across 20 Transition Countries 
Dependent Variable: commercial banks‘ 3-months lending rates in 
1996 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GOVDEF 15.529 1.766 
(0.009) (0.261) 
GOVDEBT 2.565 -0.032 -0.012 -0.506 2.753 
(0.000) (0.922) (0.971) (0.116) (0.000) 
FDI/GDP (STOCKS) -1.210 -1.637 -1.531 -1.540 
(0.222) (0 104) (0.135) (0.08 I ) 
FDI/GDP (FLOWS) -4.000 
(0 285) 
EXPORT SHARE -37.263 -I 10.724 
(0.397) (0.023) 
BARTER 1.085 
(0.080) 
LEGAL -37.686 
(0.036) 
R2 Adj. 0.273 0.630 0.208 0.096 0.077 0.556 0.695 
N 20 18 I2 12 12 11 17 
OLS - regressions; p - values in parentheses 
Source: International Monetary Fond. International Financial Statistics 
BARTER = barter trade in percent of sales 
GOVDEBT = general government debt in percent of GDP 
GOVDEF = general government deficit in percent of GDP 
EXPORT SHARE = exports in percent of GDP 
FDI!GDP (STOCKS) = incoming foreign direct investment (stocks) in percent of GDP 
FDI/GDP (FLOWS) = incoming foreign direct investment (flows) in percent of GDP 
LEGAL = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, index of commercial law: 
the index goes from 1 (never effective) to 5 (always effective) 
percent per annum 
1999 
(8) (9) (10) (11) 
-0.250 -0.682 
(0.870) (0 720) 
0.039 
(0.697) 
0.005 
(0.981) 
-0.45 I -0.595 
(0.220) (0 362) 
17.014 
(0.767) 
-0.049 
(0.948) 
c-~ -0.013 -0.246 
20 17 16 13 
Table 8. Determinants of Bank Credit to the Real Sector Across 20 Transition Countries in 1996 and 1999 
Dependent variable: credit to the private sector in percent of GDP 
1996 1999 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FMREG 
GOVDEBT 
GOVDEF 
EXPORT SHARE 
BARTER 
FDI/CiDP (STOCKS) 
R’ Adj. 
N 
10.251 10.466 8.009 9.248 15.716 12.403 12.932 10.798 11.574 12.582 
(0.012) (0.01 I) (0.041) (0.014) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.083) 
0.135 -0.103 -0.002 -0.030 
(0.081) (0.568) (0.971) (0.754) 
-0.335 -0.321 -1.186 -0.801 
(0.640) (0.631) (0.109) (0.281) 
36.200 38.803 23.002 27.744 
(0.079) (0.070) (0.139) (0.129) 
-0.480 0.073 
(0.080) (0.750) 
0.898 0.064 
(0.092) (0.830) 
0.281 0.386 0.374 0.460 0.501 0.505 0.383 0.544 0.475 0.255 
19 I8 19 18 12 19 17 19 18 14 
OLS - regressions; p - values in parentheses 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report; World Business Environment Survey, World Bank - 
EBRD. 1999 
FINREG = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, index of non banking financial institutions reform; 
index goes from I (little or no change from the previous regime) to 4+ (industrialised market economy standard). 
GOVDEBT = general government debt in percent of GDP 
GOVDEF = government deficit in percent of GDP 
EXPORT SHARE = exports in percent of GDP 
BARTER = barter trade in percent of sales 
FDI/GDP (STOCKS) = incoming foreign direct investment (stocks) in percent of GDP 
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in the country. We use the index for non-bank financial institutions as a proxy for 
bank reform rather than the index for banking reform itself to avoid problems of 
multi-colinearity in the regression. Not surprising, the level of bank intermediation 
tends to increase in the countries with more progress in banking reform. 
We turn to the post financial crisis year of 1999 to see whether the financial 
crisis has changed the lending behavior of banks. This is shown in columns (8) to (11) 
of Tables 7 and in columns (6) to (10) of Table 8. Four things are noteworthy. First, 
the two variables, EXPORT SHARE and FDI/GDP, capturing information asymmetry 
between the real sector and the banking sector, stop to have a significant influence on 
interest rates (Table 7) as well as on bank lending to the real sector (Table 8). Second, 
the effect of GOVDEF and GOVDEBT on lending rates becomes insignificant while 
GOVDEF has now in 1999 a marginally significant influence on bank lending to the 
private sector. Apparently, the strong reduction in the fiscal budget deficit after the 
financial crisis has boosted bank lending to the private sector which has gone beyond 
its effect on lending rates. Third, barter stops to have a significant influence on interest 
rates as well as on bank lending. 
To conclude, the drastic changes in the results of the regressions explaining 
interest rates and bank lending behavior before and after the financial crisis suggest 
that the financial crisis has changed the behavior of the banking sector in a fundamental 
way. The banking sector started to lend to the real sector. This makes it possible for 
many transition countries, most notably for Russia and Ukraine, to abandon barter 
trade and to return to the cash economy. 
VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
We have developed a model that explains both the onset of the financial crisis 
in 1998 and the striking economic recovery afterward in Russia and other former Soviet 
Union economies. Before the crisis, the economies of Russia and Ukraine were stuck 
in a banking trap in which banks failed to lend to the real sector and firms raised 
liquidity through nonbank finance, because of the coexistence of a lemons credit market 
and the government’s overissuance of bonds to finance its budget gap. Despite the 
financial exuberance on the surface, banking development was seriously hampered and 
the economic performance was poor. The collapse of the treasury-bill market triggered 
the financial crisis, which brought down many banks and destroyed the surviving banks’ 
investment opportunities in government securities. As a result, the surviving banks 
started to lend to the real sector at low interest rates, which induced more good-quality 
firms to use low-cost bank loans rather than costly nonbank finance. A strong economic 
recovery followed and provided initial conditions for further banking development. 
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Our empirical evidence, based on firm-level data and country-level data, supports the 
model’s predictions. 
Our model suggests that a financial crisis, though it often causes a credit crunch 
and a deep economic recession, may have its benefits as well. One of the benefits 
highlighted in this paper is that if an economy is stuck in a banking trap, in which the 
financial and real sectors are separated, a crisis may lead it out of the trap and thus 
bring about a strong economic recovery. This, in turn, also sets the stage for financial 
development by creating favorable initial conditions. It should be emphasized, however, 
that whether economic recovery and growth can continue depends critically on whether 
banking development can be sustained. 
Our model has several policy implications for efforts to sustain further banking 
development. A high priority should be placed on fiscal policy. It is critical that 
the government harden its budget constraint and avoid creating an environment in 
which government bonds crowd out bank loans. The economic recovery has clearly 
provided the conditions in which this could happen: since 1999, the government’s fiscal 
balance turned into a surplus in Russia as well as in Ukraine. Moreover, reducing the 
information asymmetry between banks and their borrowers is another key objective. 
Policies aiming at improving corporate governance, accounting and transparency, 
and credit risk assessment and management are all necessary. Furthermore, as bank 
lending grows, an effective enforcement of loan contacts becomes more important, 
as suggested by Perotti (2002). Finally, our results suggest that in order to sustain 
banking development, the banks’ returns on loans should be attractive. Thus, at an 
early stage of bank development, a moderate amount of competition in the banking 
sector is desirable. If bank competition is too strong, however, it will be difficult to 
maintain the incentives of banks to lend to the real sector and to invest in evaluating 
credit risk. 
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APPENDIX II: Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 2: Given the quality rank of firms, Xi > X2 > . ..A.-1 > A, > 
. . . > XN, without loss of generality, let us start with firm n, which is chosen that for 
given XJJ and s; this firm will borrow, but all n - 1 better quality firms do not borrow 
in the lending market. However, the n - 1 firms’ withdrawal from the lending market 
lowers the average quality of the remaining N - n + 1 firms 
1 N-n+1 
LMSl = c N-n+1 xi 
2=1 
= (l+N-n+l)p 
< P+N)i 
2 
= 3,. 
The lower average quality of the pool of borrowing firms may make firm n decide not 
to borrow. Given the quality of firm n 
A, = (N - n + 1) p, 
applying Lemma 1, the general condition for firm n not to borrow is XN++i/Xn 5 y, 
or 
(l+N-n+l)p < l+s 
2(N-n+l)p - b * 
Rewrite the above condition as the following NBF equation 
ti (4 = b(N-i+2) -1 <s 2(N-n+l) - * 
Where, in general $ (n) is defined as 
$) (n) G @;nfl - 1. 
It is easy to see that $ ( ) n is a convex increazkg function of n with +!j (0) = m-1 
and $ (N) = b - 1. Thus, if 1c, (N) = b - 1 5 s, the equilibrium is n* = N, i.e. no firm 
borrows. 
Furthermore, if $ (0) = $$$ - 1 > s, by Lemma 1, all firms will borrow and 
the equilibrium is n* = 0. 
Finally, if $ (0) = $$$ - 1 < s and + (N) = b - 1 > s, there exists n* E (0, N) 
that 1c, (n*) = s. 
Concerning the stability of the equilibrium, it is easy to see that for any firm i, 
where i 5 n*, $ (i) < s (i). Thus, firm i will not borrow from banks which will push 
more firms to choose not to borrow until i = n*. Moreover, for any firm j, where j > n*, 
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$ (j> > s w Th us, firm j will borrow which pushes more firms to choose to borrow 
until j = n*. Thus, n* is a stable equilibrium. n 
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Notice that s (n) is a linear upward sloping function 
with s (0) = #v,, and s (N) = s. Moreover, R-Nt 1c, (n) is a convex upward sloping 
function with IJ (0) = w - 1, and $ (N) = b - 1. 
If s (0) > 1c, (0) and s(N) < $(N); or if (b - 1) (1 - T) > @r, > $$$ - 1, a 
unique interior equilibrium exists that n* E (0, N) and s* E (s (0) , s (N)) . Rewriting 
s (N) = s < $ (N) = b - 1 as (b - 1) (1 - %) > @, = s (0) and combining with 
s (0) > 1c, (0) we have the conditions stated in the proposition. 
Concerning the stability of the equilibrium (n*, s*), it is easy to see that for any 
firm i, where i 5 n*, $ (i) < s (i). Thus, firm i will not borrow from banks pushing up 
s and leading more firms to choose not to borrow. This makes $J (i) increase faster than 
s (i) until i = n*. Moreover, for any firm j, where j > n*, + (j) > s (j). Thus, firm j 
will borrow pushing down s and leading more firms to choose to borrow. This makes 
$ (i) decrease faster than s (i) until j = n*. Thus, (n*, s”) is a stable equilibrium. Given 
that s (n) increases (decreases) with t, ~$r, (R), th e comparative static results follow. n 
Proof of Proposition 4.2: We are going to show two possible cases when 4 is 
reduced to 4’. Notice that $ ( ) n is independent from $; and further notice that s (n) is 
a linear increasing function of 4. 
1. If 4’ is reduced moderately a unique stable interior equilibrium nc E (0, n*) exists 
such that nc Bms barter trade and the number of bartering elms is reduced. This is 
because with a lower 4’ that 
4ro > b(N+2) _ 1 2(N+l) ’ 
Applying Lemma 1 we have the result. 
2. If 4’ is reduced substantially then in equilibrium nc = 0, i.e. all Rms borrow. This is 
because with a drastic reduction of 4 to 4’ that 
#ro R W+2) -1 R-tN < 2(N+l) 
which implies s (N) < $ (0) , then in equilibrium nc = 0. n 
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